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Introduction 
Since the fall of the socialist regime in 1989/90, Hungary is a functioning parliamentary 
democracy: a republic with a multiparty political system, governed by the rule of law. Like the 
constitutional and institutional framework of governance, also the system of legislation 
underwent major changes compared to the one-party-system at the end of the 1980s, when by-
laws and other low-level sources of law determined significant policy issues, restricted 
fundamental rights; transparency and democratic legitimation were lacking. Nowadays one can 
witness the opposite: high-level legislative acts (laws requiring either simple or qualified 
majority) dominate the legislative scene, turning parliament into a legislative machinery, 
leaving no time for thorough preparation and deliberation, adopting laws overloaded with 
details which would sometimes better fit into secondary legislation.  
As a result, legislation rules mainly focus on procedures and formalities, while policy contents 
and quality gain less attention, and impact assessments aren’t taken into serious consideration.2 
Especially – but not exclusively - the FIDESZ-government in office since 2010 has come up 
with an ambitious legislative agenda, including many accelerated procedures and frequently 
modified legislation – and some corrective procedural measures (e.g. limiting the number of 
fast track procedures) after 2014.3 
This paper describes the current institutional-legislative framework and practice of preparation 
of statutory legislation in Hungary. After introducing the institutions, procedures and some data 
related to legislation, internal workflows of the government and the role of the relevant actors 
will be analysed.  
 
Overview of the constitutional and political system  
The form of government in Hungary – as well as political practice - is parliamentarian. The 
main organ of state power in Hungary is the unicameral legislature (Országgyűlés) with 199 
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members (MPs), elected for four years by direct universal suffrage. The Cabinet (Kormány) is 
politically strongly linked to parliament, according to the principles of parliamentary 
governance. The head of the state, the president (Köztársasági elnök) is a representative 
position, without effective control rights towards parliament, elected by the legislature. His 
main role is to safeguard the proper functioning the three main branches of power and 
promulgate laws adopted by parliament. The president also has the right to introduce legislation 
in parliament. However, presidents hardly ever made any use of this right, apart from few 
legislative proposals at the beginning of the 1990s. More frequent is the suspensive veto of the 
president: he may return any adopted statue for reconsideration to parliament, but has to sign 
them nevertheless, if parliament adopts it again with or without amendments. The main form 
of state power in Hungary is representative democracy, the institution of direct democracy 
(referendum) is used only very exceptionally. The state structure and fundamental rights are set 
out in the Fundamental Law (Alaptörvény), the country’s written constitution, dating back to 
2011.  
The operative executive organ of the country, the Cabinet, has among others the task to take 
the necessary measures to ensure public order and security, to prepare and implement the state 
budget, to determine the foreign policy and conclude international agreements on its behalf. 
Generally, the Cabinet is also responsible for executing laws adopted by parliament.  
The Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister (Miniszterelnök) and the Cabinet ministers. The 
Prime Minister is not just a formal leader of Cabinet: he also defines and directs its policy. He 
is elected by a simple majority vote of the MPs, while ministers are proposed by the Prime 
Minister, and appointed (and relieved) of their duties by the president. The Cabinet bears a 
collective political responsibility towards parliament. The central role of the Prime Minister is 
reflected by the provision that it is not possible to initiate a vote of no-confidence against an 
individual minister, only against the Prime Minister, who represents the whole Cabinet. In order 
to guarantee stability, the Fundamental Law makes only the constructive form of the confidence 
vote possible: the majority of MPs have to agree on the new Prime Minister before withdrawing 
confidence from the previous one.  
The establishment of ministries falls within the competence of parliament and a law defines 
their name and broad portfolio in each legislative term,4  while the detailed tasks of the 
ministries are set out by the Cabinet in a decree.5 Each ministry is headed by a single responsible 
minister who is also a member of the Cabinet. Under ministers, state secretaries are responsible 
for a certain policy field. 
In lack of a second chamber or other kind of co-legislator in Hungary, the main ‘check and 
balance’ to parliament’s legislation is the Constitutional Court (Alkotmánybíróság). The Court, 
established in 1989, followed the model of the German Federal Constitutional Court, controls 
the constitutionality of legislation and judicial decisions. It comprises a separate branch of state 
power and is not considered to be part of the judiciary. By the end of the 1990s, the Court 
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developed a case law which was of great importance as regards the new constitutional system, 
many of those principles were later enacted in the Fundamental Law in 2011. 
The judiciary is independent from the legislative and executive powers, it is comprised by a 
separate ordinary and administrative court system. Ordinary courts are local, municipal courts, 
appellate courts and the Supreme Court (Kúria) as final instance. Courts directly interpret the 
acts of the legislation, while the Constitutional Court checks any legislative acts against the 
constitution and may strike them or parts of them down if they are in contradiction with the 
constitution. Replacing the annulled legislation, however, is in the exclusive competence of the 
parliament.  
The Constitutional Court is therefore an important actor in the field of legislation, having quite 
a wide range of competences.6 It has the sole right to interpret the Fundamental Law; it provides 
normative standards and ex-ante as well as ex-post supervision over the constitutionality of 
legislation (an ex-ante supervision takes place after parliament adopted but the president not 
yet promulgated the law, an ex-post takes place after promulgation); it also reconciles collisions 
between international and domestic law. The Court may also determine the violation of the 
constitution by an omission if a legislative body omitted to adopt legislation necessary for 
implementing a certain constitutional provision. Also ordinary court judges may initiate the 
procedure if they conclude that the law they are to interpret contradicts the Fundamental Law. 
The Court also establishes the public responsibilities of the head of state and other public 
officials; and it determines the spheres of authority of municipalities and local authorities, and 
interprets limitations on public referendums.7 
 
Legal and institutional framework for the preparation of legislation 
Sources of law and their role in the legal system 
As in other civil law countries, in Hungary, below the constitution, the highest sources of law 
are parliament-made laws. Besides statutory legislation, parliament holds constituent power as 
well: it may approve and amend the constitution with qualified majority (2/3 of all MPs) . The 
constitution may be thus seen as quite flexible: the incumbent two-third majority may amend 
or adopt constitution anytime without involving any other organs or calling for a referendum. 
As a result, the constitution has constantly been subject of changes; the current Fundamental 
law underwent seven amendments since its adoption in 2011. 
The Fundamental Law (Art. T) describes the four levels of legislation in following hierarchy:  
 the Fundamental Law,  
 laws adopted by the parliament (törvény),  
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 governmental and ministerial decrees (kormányrendelet/miniszteri rendelet), adopted by the 
Cabinet as a whole or a minister (they become valid only if published in the Official Gazette of 
Hungary – Magyar Közlöny)  
 and decrees of local governments (önkormányzati rendelet).  
The hierarchy between these sources of law mean that a decree may not contradict a statutory 
law, and no legal source may contradict the Fundamental Law. The Fundamental Law also 
accepts the universally recognized rules and regulations of international law without any further 
implementation, and guarantees to harmonize domestic legal acts with the obligations assumed 
under international law. According to the dualist practice, parliament and Cabinet need to 
implement international treaties in legislation of their own domain. A significant number of all 
legislative acts (appr. 1/3 of all laws) are enactments of international agreements. 
Laws are normally adopted by simple majority vote in parliament. However, some laws need a 
qualified majority approval, as specified in the Fundamental Law.8 These are called cardinal 
laws (sarkalatos törvény). The distinction between ordinary and cardinal laws was a result of 
the compromise between old and new elites in 1989. The issues requiring qualified majority are 
thus not selected by value, weight or importance, rather by a political agreement reached at the 
roundtable discussions thirty years ago. Since many policy areas are affected, major reforms 
need a compromise between Cabinet and opposition. However, between 1994 and 1998, and 
multiple times since 2010, the Cabinet has a 2/3 majority in parliament and can make any 
changes, including amendments to the constitution. It is important to stress that in theory, there 
is no hierarchy in the legal system between ordinary and cardinal laws. In practice, however, 
cardinal laws often work as a barrier to ordinary laws’ amendments if the required qualified 
majority in parliament is lacking.  
This legislative framework implicates that laws enjoy a strong preference in the Hungarian legal 
system. Besides the Fundamental Law, which describes some legislative subjects to be 
regulated exclusively by law,9 parliament generally may expand its almost unlimited legislative 
activity to any areas previously not or only partly regulated by law. The Fundamental Law 
requires also that the legislation affecting fundamental rights and duties to be enacted in 
statutory legislation. Furthermore, parliament has the exclusive right to regulate fields which 
are already regulated by law. Once parliament has brought the matter within the scope of 
statutory regulation, this may be modified or repealed only by the adoption of another law. As 
a result, the number of yearly adopted laws is increasing, also because it is often a matter of 
prestige for the line ministries to place their legislation to the highest possible source of law. 
Replacing laws by lower level instruments hardly ever happens,  the necessary time and 
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political will is hardly there. The legislative competence of the Cabinet is limited to the areas 
not regulated by laws. 
As a result of this dominance of laws, their number is relatively high in the legal system. This 
is in huge contrast with the situation in the past socialist regime where only a few laws were 
adopted by parliament each year, and legislation was generally practiced by different subjects 
(Presidential Council, Council of Ministers) deciding behind closed doors. After this extremity, 
nowadays one can witness the opposite: between 1990 and 2020 parliament adopted more than 
5000 laws, more than half of the amending previously adopted ones. Parliament passes almost 
200 laws each year, the number have slightly increased with time.10 Laws are changing rapidly: 
only one third of the 5000 laws are currently in force, the others – mostly due to their merely 
amending character – have already been repealed. The current situation is shown also from the 
following numbers of legislative acts currently in force: 
 
Table 1: Legislation currently in force in Hungary 
Legislative act klein Quantity Average length11 
Law 1849 121500 
Government decree 2517 50700 
Ministerial decree 2827 60722 
 
Source: www.njt.hu (National Legal Database, as of March 2020). 
 
Delegated legislation plays a secondary role in the Hungarian legal system, contrary to an ideal 
situation where primary and secondary legislation have the same importance notwithstanding 
the hierarchy between them. By-laws are sometimes seen as ‘second-class’ legislative acts, thus 
the general intention of the executive is to regulate as much as possible in law. The numbers of 
average length show also that laws are normally more detailed than secondary legislation, the 
opposite of an ideal situation.  
It should be added that delegation in Hungary does not mean empowerment, i.e. delegation of 
legislative power of one legislative organ to the other, it rather means activating the legislative 
power of a lower legislative organ by a higher one. Parliament may never delegate its law-
making power to the Cabinet, it may only require the Cabinet to legislate by adopting a decree 
in a subject matter within its own legislative domain. Cabinet may never adopt legislation on 
statutory level, not even in extraordinary circumstances. In case of  delegation, the Cabinet is 
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obliged to act, although there are normally no time limits and consequences for non-acting. 
However, the Cabinet may not sub-delegate legislative power it received from the parliament, 
as well as ministers may not sub-delegate their legislative tasks to any other organ.  While 
Cabinet may adopt a decree on its own initiative (in case the subject is not yet regulated by law) 
as well as by statutory delegation, a minister may only adopt a decree upon delegation.  
As seen above, instead of a pyramidal structure, where ministerial decrees would represent the 
majority of the legal acts with the most detailed rules, we are witnessing a ‘top-heavy’ structure 
of legislation with laws on the first place in number as well as in length. Of course, the basis of 
the extensive statutory legislation is the expertise of the Cabinet: the majority of laws adopted 
by parliament were Cabinet initiatives. The Cabinet normally spends more time and efforts with 
preparing bills for submission than drafting its own secondary legislation. 
 
Legal sources on legislative drafting 
Besides the Fundamental law, another important legal source of legislation is the Law on 
Legislation (LoL) from 2010, which sets out the general rules of law-making, including:  
 the prohibition of retroactive effect (with the exception of an exclusively positive effect on all 
stakeholders),  
 the requirements of delegated and transitional legislation,  
 the general rules of geographic and personal effect of legislative acts,  
 the formal rules of amending and repealing existing legislation,  
 the obligation of impact assessment, 
 the rules of justification (reasoning) of legislative proposals,  
 the rules on  promulgation, transparency and availability of the legislation.12   
The Law also regulates the internal rules of organs of public law (közjogi szervezetszabályozó 
eszköz), which may only affect persons within the respective organ and do not have general 
effect. An important issue, public consultations of legislation has been outsourced in 2010 and 
is being governed by a separate law ever since (see details further below).13 
Legislative drafting rules are to be found in a decree of the Minister of Justice.14 With its 150 
articles, it is the longest legislative act from the domain of legislation. Beyond the normative 
provisions of legislative drafting, there is an equally long set of annexes attached to it, providing 
textual examples for formulation of legal provisions (e.g. use of references, formula for 
amendments). The decree contains provisions on linguistic aspects, designs the formal structure 
and sections of legislative acts (book, chapter, title, article, paragraph, point) as well as the 
logical structure (preamble, general provisions, detailed provisions, final provisions).  
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Another ministerial decree that need mentioning regulates ex-ante and ex-post impact 
assessment of all legislative acts.15 The brief decree (only eight articles!) contains the tasks, 
describes the documents and their content during the impact assessment process. An ‘impact 
assessment form’ is attached to the decree as annex, which need to be filled for all legislative 
proposals. However, the form is a one-page document with three chapters each with open space 
subject to free formulations: ‘I. Budgetary impacts’, ‘II. Administrative burdens’, ‘III. Other 
impacts.’ The previous legislation, which was in force between 2011 and 2016, foresaw a more 
detailed evaluation form, which was albeit not used in regular practice and was radically 
simplified in 2016.  
The practice of impact assessments corresponds to the weak regulatory framework: as a pre-
2010 comparative research found, Hungary almost altogether ignored the preparation of 
regulatory impact assessments. Few regulatory issues were addressed, and if they were, they 
were introduced in an ad hoc manner. Even if Hungary was the first in the region to introduce 
RIAs in legislative procedure, the practice showed a fragmented, sporadic and formal attitude 
towards them.16 Since 2010 the RIA procedure has been streamlined and used in a more 
systematic way, but it is rather a tool to control the administrative services than to secure quality 
legislation.17 The LoL only foresees impact assessment of governmental bills, proposals from 
the MPs are excluded. 
Even from the structure of legal sources dealing with legislation it is obvious that the formal 
rules dominate and policy content quality tools are of secondary importance. Elaborate, 
detailed, sometimes rigorous provisions govern the formalities, while the content and quality 
of legislation lag behind.   
 
Analysis of practical functioning of the preparatory process 
There are four possible proposers of statutory legislation in Hungary, as set out in the 
Fundamental Law: the Cabinet, MPs (either as single proposers or as groups of MPS), the 
President of Hungary, and parliamentary committees. In practice, the latter two hardly practice 
their right. On the contrary, many MPs, especially opposition MPs submit legislative proposals 
to parliament, even if these are hardly ever approved, and often do not even enter into 
parliamentary procedure, not being  discussed either by committee or by plenary. There is no 
procedural guarantee of debating opposition bills, even a minimum of them.  Most laws adopted 
by parliament start their career as Cabinet proposals.   
                                                   
15 Decree no. 12/2016 of the Minister leading the Prime Minister’s office on Ex-ante and ex-post impact 
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By Cabinet proposals, the procedure of preparation of bills begins with the submission of the 
legislative plan on a sessional basis, as the Law on the National Assembly requires.18  In 
practice, at the beginning of each parliamentary session (semester), the Cabinet submits its 
legislation plan to parliament, including those bills planned to be submitted to parliament. This 
list is put together from the scheduled legislative proposals of the line ministries and finalized 
by the Prime Minister’s administration. Since it happens regularly that many items from the list 
are not submitted or at the same time other bills appear without being originally scheduled, the 
plan is not treated in practice as a strategic tool of targeted government policy, rather as an 
information on what workload parliament has to face in the upcoming months. 
The legislative plan in practice has  an Excel-sheet format with columns for the name of the 
proposal, the responsible ministry, a short description of content in 3-4 lines, the planned month 
of submission to parliament, the expected month of adoption by parliament, and the volume 
described by one of three simple variables (‘short’, ‘medium’, ‘long’). There is no textual 
explanation and analysis related to government policies. The plan only contains prospective 
laws, but not governmental or ministerial decrees.  
In practice, the plan is regularly and timely submitted, but it is hardly ever fully implemented: 
about half of the items are dropped, and a similar number of new proposal are submitted 
spontaneously in the course of the legislative term.19 If there is a shortage of time at (for 
example at the end of the legislative session), the political agenda normally prevails over policy 
planning. In autumn 2017 for example, there were 46 items on the legislative plan, in spring 
2018 only one (due to the upcoming elections), for autumn 2018 there were 39 items foreseen. 
As far as the intra-institutional organization is concerned, each ministry has a legal department 
also responsible for legislative drafting. This department is normally supervised by the 
administrative state secretary, the de facto director of the ministry. The details of the procedure 
of Cabinet’s legislative preparation are set out in a decision of the Cabinet on its rules of 
procedure (RoPC).20 As a first practical step of the legislative drafting procedure, this service 
drafts a legislative proposal, which is subject to revision and approval by the minister or his 
cabinet.21 This involves the ‘political line’ already at the very first stage of the process. It is also 
common that the policy departments of the ministry take part in the drafting as well, but the 
general responsibility lies at the legal unit. At major legislative tasks, the drafting is sometimes 
outsourced to a drafting committee consisting of senior experts of the particular field (eg. Civil 
Code, Penal Code reforms from 2012).  
This ‘ministerial draft’ is then sent to the central coordinative unit of the Cabinet (§ 15 RoPC). 
This unit was traditionally placed at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), which is a central 
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government organ, headed, like a ministry, by a Cabinet minister. Since June 2018 however, 
policy legislative coordination is a responsibility of the Government Office of the Prime 
Minister (GOPM), a central government office, separated from the PMO, and headed by the 
Prime Minister himself. The coordination of Cabinet legislation is managed by the 
administrative state secretary of the GOPM directly supervised by the Prime Minister directly. 
This means that under current setup, PMO is rather a strategic coordination body than a 
legislative one, responsible for mainly long-term policy planning. The coordination of 
legislation within the Cabinet is  done by the GOPM.22 The administrative state secretary of 
GOPM checks whether the legislative proposal is ‘in line with the general policy of the 
government’, as the rules of procedure of the Cabinet require. High profile political issues are 
therefore possible to be taken into account already at this stage, even before inter-ministerial or 
public consultations. 
After the legislative proposal (which is a detailed, paragraphed text already at this stage, and 
not a conceptual paper) is checked by the GOPM and the Ministry of Finance, the bill is 
circulated within all line ministries, and in the same time published on the website of the 
government for public consultation. Both lime ministries and the general public, working 
parallelly, have very short deadlines. The responsible ministry has the task of evaluating the 
consultations, finalizing the draft, and preparing it for adoption by the Cabinet (§ 12 RoPC). 
During inter-ministerial consultations, in almost all cases only legislative units of other 
ministries take part in the process, policy departments very often do not have the possibility 
(and time) to interact. Comments of other ministries made to a legislative proposal are usually 
done by e-mail exchanges, and are neither open for the public nor kept in a searchable database, 
their content is therefore not available for further analysis. 
During inter-ministerial consultations, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has the task to review 
constitutional and legal aspects, including EU-related legal matters. Therefore, all bills and draft 
decrees (including ministerial ones) are subject to an opinion of the MoJ during the inter-
ministerial consultation, which is to be prepared in extremely short deadlines, often in one or 
two days, or just a few hours.23 As a legislative expert body, MoJ sometimes interferes with the 
central legislative coordination body of the government (currently the GOPM). Practically, the 
MoJ is rather one of the line ministries, representing the legal profession, than a strategic or 
coordinative body, as it was until the mid-1990s.24 
The process of drafting and consulting bills of the Cabinet may take several months, partly 
depending on the length of the proposal, but more often on the sensitivity of the area to be 
regulated. However no procedural rules apply to bills submitted by the MPs, except for an 
simple obligation to provide a reasoning for the bill (§ 18 LoL). MPs usually do not have 
professional drafters in their team to prepare correctly worded legislative proposals and there 
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is only a limited staff available within the team of parliamentary groups. Also, there is neither 
obligation nor tradition for MPs to consult the public during drafting legislation, with the 
justification that MPs proposals usually address questions that have high relevance in daily 
politics followed by an intensive press coverage, therefore the opinion of the public is ‘well 
known’. 
While most MPs´ proposals of legislation come from the opposition25, MPs on the Cabinet side 
also submit bills regularly. Typical proposals made by MPs supporting the government are short 
provisions or amendments in bills that address a simple but politically sensitive issue. The main 
driver behind these type of bills is the faster procedure than the usual preparation within the 
government services.26 Especially the Cabinet after the elections in 2010 used this type of fast 
tracking. Between 2010 and 2014, almost half of adopted laws started as MPs’ bills.  
The ‘Law on public consultations in the preparatory phase of the legislative procedure’ (LPC), 
adopted in 2010 contains mostly broad principles and just few details. The ‘widest possible 
range’ of public opinions (preamble) should be facilitated, allowing ‘appropriate time’ (§ 10) 
with ‘the most transparency’ (§ 2) during public consultations of legislative concepts or drafts. 
However, there are no exact numbers and data explaining these broad terms. As a general rule, 
only governmental bills are subject to a public consultations (§ 1). Nevertheless, many 
exceptions apply: bills adopted during urgent legislative procedures shall not be consulted as 
well as if there is danger to Hungary’s important military, state security, financial, foreign 
policy, environmental or cultural heritage interests (§ 10).  
According to the LPC, there are two forms of consultations: open consultations online, and 
direct consultations upon invitation on the responsible minister (§ 7). In case of an open 
consultation, the legislative proposal is published at the Cabinet’s website. Anyone can send a 
comment per e-mail, but there is no administrative obligation to reply, only the receipt of the 
comment should be confirmed. The deadline for posting comments is the same as for inter-
ministerial consultation: the general public has the same, rather limited time as the professional 
staff of the ministries, which makes public consultations rather unrealistic. Deadlines hardly 
exceed a week, and the five days set as a minimum by the rules of procedure is not respected in 
practice, usually the consultation only takes two or three days. The website used for consultation 
is embedded in the website of the Cabinet and there is no transparent, searchable database of 
items under public consultation.27 The comments are also not published on the website, the 
ministry only has obligation to prepare a summary document with the list of those who 
commented and justification for rejected comments. 
                                                   
25 Legislative proposals submitted by the opposition almost never become laws. For a detailed analysis see C 
Nikolenyi and C Friedberg, ’Vehicles of opposition influence or agents of the governing majority? Legislative 
committees and private members’ bills in the Hungarian Országgyűlés and the Israeli Knesset (2019) 25 The 
Journal of Legislative Studies 358-374; R Zubek, ‘Negative Agenda Control and Executive–Legislative Relations 
in East Central Europe, 1997–2008’ (2011) 17 The Journal of Legislative Studies 172-192. 
26 Gajduschek 2016, ibid, p. 802. 
27 Database is available at http://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok#!DocumentBrowse.  
The other form, the ‘direct consultations’ are not open for the public at all. This process is based 
on long-term partnership agreements (covering maximum the parliamentary term) between the 
ministry and related stakeholders “representing wide social interest or performing scientific 
activity”. The LPC provides a list of possible partners, including civil organizations, churches, 
scientific organizations, representation of nationalities, universities or chambers. There are 
several laws requiring consultation on certain policy issues. Subject, timeframe of consultations 
and the form of communication (personal negotiations are possible here, contrary to open 
consultations) should be set out in the agreement, which should be “made available for anyone”. 
The strategic partners having entered into such agreements have the obligation to “represent the 
opinion of other organizations not having such an agreement”. 
In theory, it is possible to consult the legislative concept as well as the final legislative draft (§ 
5). In practice, a legislative concept hardly ever exist,28 normative texts are drafted immediately, 
at the very early stage of the legislative procedure. In the past decades, several stakeholders 
attempted to claim the negligence of public consultations at the Constitutional Court, but the 
Court in its consistent practice rejected these arguments, stating that the lack of consultation 
lies in the political responsibility of the  Cabinet, and it does not affect the legal effect of the 
legislative acts.29 The Court also stated that from the legal perspective, the legislative procedure 
as such starts in parliament, which is a forum for democratic deliberation, and the preparatory 
phase should be left to the proponent’s (Cabinet or individual MP) discretion. The preparatory 
phase is therefore completely excluded from constitutional review. 
The Cabinet is obliged to prepare a preliminary impact assessment with the aim to check if the 
proposal contains serious contradiction with existing domestic or EU law as well, and the effect 
of the proposal on the national budget is also assessed. The proposal is therefore accompanied 
by a brief preliminary legal and economic impact assessment. In practice, this assessment is 
only of formal nature, and is hardly taken very seriously by any actor in the process, it has low 
impact on the planning or decision-making on the political level. Impact assessment sheets are 
being filled out, but the information is often incomplete, very general, and usually aims at a 
political message rather than evaluating the factual impacts.30 This situation might be explained 
also by the observation that Hungarian legislative thinking is dominated by formality, 
overshadowing the real aims and possible impacts of legislation.31 Legislation often becomes 
the target itself, instead of a tool to reach policy targets.32 
                                                   
28 T Drinóczi, Minőségi jogalkotás és adminisztratív terhek csökkentése Európában (HVG-ORAC 2010). 
29 See for example following decisions of the Constitutional Court: 7/2004 (III. 24.), 29/2006 (VI. 21.), 87/2008 
(VI. 18.), 109/2008 (IX. 26.). 
30 A Gyűrű, ‘A jogszabályok és a stratégiai tervek környezeti hatásvizsgálatának gyakorlata’ (2012) Pro Futuro 
85-102.  
31 K Jugovits, ‘A jogalkotás tartalmi megalapozottsága a jogi oktatás tükrében’ (2016) Pro Publico Bono – Magyar 
Közigazgatás 36–49. 
32 This becomes obvious as we look at the difference between level of development at legislative drafting 
techniques and impact assessment methodology. The latter is lagging behind the first: National Assembly services 
recently elaborated a software (PARLEX, available at http://www.parlament.hu/parlex) for legislative drafting and 
After the inter-ministerial consultation, the proposal will be put on the agenda of the weekly 
meeting of administrative state secretaries of all ministries (MASS), chaired by the 
administrative secretary of GOPM (§ 39-50 RoPC). This format is the general preparatory 
forum of the Cabinet’s weekly sittings where all bills and draft decrees have to pass. This is the 
last chance to reconcile line ministries’ interests and harmonize within the government services. 
The meetings of MASS are not open for the public. In practice, there were estimates that in the 
late 1990s about one-third of agenda items were not passed and sent back to the ministries for 
reconsideration.33 Since 2010, due to a more streamlined mechanism, this number is much 
smaller. 
After the proposal is approved at MASS, it can be discussed by the Cabinet or one of its smaller 
circles (thematic and strategic cabinets). There are currently four such formats, headed by the 
responsible minister and consisting of the relevant ministers: the Cabinet for Strategic and 
Family issues, the Economic Cabinet, the State Security Cabinet, and the Cabinet for National 
Policy (§ 1 RoPC). This is another stage when political actors can intervene and send the issue 
back to an earlier stage for reconsideration. In practice, the frequency of returns highly depends 
on the persons involved at this decision-making stage. 
Since 2010, political lines have not divided the Cabinet as there has been no coalition 
government in Hungary. Until 2009, various models of policy coordination between coalition 
parties were used. Between 1990-1994 each ministry headed by a minister from one coalition 
partner had a state secretary from the other (cohabitation model). During the 1994-1998 period 
there was a system of linked ministries attached to one single coalition party, accompanied with 
a strong coordination mechanism orchestrated by a steering committee and mutual veto rights. 
In the next period (1998-2002), the isolation (and mutual distrust) between ministries headed 
by different parties of the coalition became complete, and „pet projects” of ministers (whether 
reasonable or not) were implemented without significant coordinative control.34 In 2009, the 
ruling coalition broke up, paving the way for the opposition. FIDESZ (in alliance with KDNP) 
won the elections in 2010, but as these parties formed common candidate lists, the Cabinet was 
based on a party alliance rather than coalition. The negative reputation of coalition governance 
has resulted in a rejection of coalitions and the popularity of the single-party governments 
within the general public in Hungary. 
 
Cabinet bills in the parliamentary phase 
Like in most European countries, the last decades were characterized by the emerging 
importance of the Cabinet and the decreasing role of the parliament in Hungary. As a result of 
                                                   
workflow which will soon be used by all governmental drafting services, including inter-ministerial consultations 
(the system will accordingly be extended to a network called GOVLEX). The tool makes possible to reach a high 
level of perfection at formal rules of drafting (numbering, references, wording etc.), while policy content and 
impact assessment are hardly addressed in current workflow. 
33 Pesti 2002, ibid. 
34 Pesti 2015, ibid.   
this tendency, we can almost say that parliament does not ‘legislate’ any more, it is rather 
approving, ‘rubber-stamping’ legislation prepared by the Cabinet. Parliament does not have the 
capacity (time, expertise) to thoroughly discuss and revise the legislative drafts, it mostly gives 
the forum only for highlighting issues which are politically sensitive or strategically important 
for the parties. This tendency is strengthened by the “political government” approach of the last 
years, since 2010 parliament plays a decreasing role in the policy process. As following the 
traditional model of the ‘working parliament’, the Hungarian National Assembly dedicates 
most if its time to formal legislation procedures, however, this time is also quite limited, 
thorough debates on legislative agenda items are hardly influencing the outcome. 
Governmental bills, after having been approved by the Cabinet, are sent by the Prime Minister 
to parliament and consequently, immediately published on the parliament’s website (this 
applies also to MPs’ bills). This is the initial phase of the most transparent part of the legislative 
procedure: all parliamentary documents are openly accessible via the parliament’s website. 
Having avoided the quality review of the MoJ, there is one ‘checkpoint’ for MPs’ proposals 
during the parliamentary phase as these bills are subject to an additional admissibility check by 
a designated committee. In practice this is rather a political filter instead of a legal assessment: 
opposition proposals regularly fail, bills from governmental MPs normally pass. The Cabinet 
also needs to give its opinion on all bills submitted by MPs. 
The parliamentary stage of the legislative process is regulated by the rules of procedure of the 
parliament35 and the Law on the National Assembly36. The parliamentary debate may only start 
if at least six days pass after the submission of the bill.. The first main step is then the general 
debate (first reading) at the plenary, followed by the detailed debate in a sectoral committee 
(the second reading). MPs may submit amendments before the committee session, which are 
approved or rejected by the committee. After the committee stage, all bills are checked by the 
Committee for Legislation (established in 2014) as well, which may also amend the proposal. 
Finally, the closing debate and final vote take place at the plenary session.  
The Hungarian parliament is one of the fastest to legislate within the EU. The whole 
parliamentary phase takes only four to five weeks in average, if the ordinary (not accelerated) 
procedure is used. However, there are possibilities upon qualified majority decision to speed 
up the process and approve legislation even within two days. The possibility of having a law 
adopted so quickly often leads to a temptation for politicians to react to societal challenges 
within quick legislation, usually without thorough preparation and elaboration. The share of 
laws that were amended within one year of their (original) adoption grew from about 5 to 8 
percent (before 2010) to almost 25 percent after 2011.37 
During parliamentary process, the proposal is being debated and possibly amended in 
committee and plenary. While opposition MPs seek to change the policy of the proposal, most 
amendments submitted by governmental MPs rather seek to correct technical mistakes which 
                                                   
35 Decision no. 10/2014 of the National Assembly on Certain rules of parliamentary procedure. 
36 Law on the National Assembly No. 36/2012. 
37 P Smuk, ‘Az Országgyűlés’ in J Szerk and G Gajduschek, A magyar jogrendszer állapota (MTA TK 2016) 631. 
remained in the bills after the inter-ministerial consultation and controlling phase. Especially 
the Committee for Legislation has the task to take care of the coherence of the bill, relying on 
the (confidential) opinion of the legislative department of the parliamentary services.38 As far 
as parliamentary debates are concerned, the time reserved for debating bills has been 
continuously decreasing, and the debates have little or no impact on the outcome. The 
parliamentary phase of legislation slowly becomes an obligatory but purely formal task in 
Hungary. 39 
 
Table 2: The number of recently adopted bills (broken down by proposing subject) 
Year Members of parliament Cabinet klein Committee 
  submitted adopted submitted adopted submitted adopted 
2010 – 
2014 
902 269 597 570 22 20 
2014 – 
2018 
744 146 566 564 24 17 
2014 114 24 63 70 6 3 
2015 231 42 182 181 9 7 
2016 224 42 156 148 2 2 
2017 175 38 165 165 7 5 
2018 116 19 103 113 4 4 
2019 86 11 107 114 4 4 
Source: Data extracted from www.parlament.hu.  
Note: 2014 and 2018 were election years with less parliamentary activity before the elections. The number 
of these years only shows the activity of the newly elected parliament. Since some bills were submitted by 
the Cabinet before the elections, Cabinet has higher adoption numbers than submissions. 
 
The afterlife of laws also deserves a short mention. An important feature of the Hungarian legal 
system is the high number of amendments of recently adopted laws. In some policy areas 
governed mainly by laws overloaded with detailed provisions (education, health, agriculture 
                                                   
38 During the 1990s it happened that contradicting amendments remained in the final version of the bill after the 
final vote, which led to another vote or correction by the official gazette. 
39 Zs Szabó, ‘Hozzáadott érték benyújtás és elfogadás között: viták és módosító javaslatok az Országgyűlésben 
2006–2016 között’ (2017) Parlamenti Szemle 25-47. 
etc.), it is common to bring a yearly or sessional ‘update package’ to parliament packed into a 
huge set of amendments. These so-called ‘salad laws’ often modify dozens, or even up to a 
hundred of other laws, sometimes reflecting changes in relevant EU legislation or consequences 
of the cross-sectoral reform policies (e.g. e-government), but often only correcting previous 
wrong drafting or target-setting. Many laws have an already ‘scheduled’ amendment rate of 
two to three major amendments per year. This is most obvious at the taxation legislation, which 
is amended regularly, together with the budget approval. The law amended most times 
underwent 525 (mostly technical) textual amendments, although it was adopted only in 2011.40  
While this trend can be partly explained by the structure of the legal system and the even faster 
changing novelties of our modern times, there are amendments which are aiming at correcting 
previously made mistakes caused by time pressure. As noted above, the number of laws 
modified within a year is increasing. The average number of amendments during lifetime of a 
law reaches 14 and laws are more frequently amended than secondary legislation. The genre of 
ex-post evaluations, which could support a more consistent framework for ex-post amendments, 
is strictly voluntary (§21 LoL) and in practice almost completely missing in Hungary.41 Ex-post 
scrutiny in parliamentary committees is a task in theory, but hardly ever takes place in practice. 
 
Conclusions  
Hungarian legislation can generally be described as quickly adopted, instable and overgrown. 
A strategic approach for drafting legislation does not exist, neither ex-ante nor ex-post 
evaluations are given enough weight. The legislative practice is dominated by the daily political 
agenda, procedural rules tempt politicians to fast reactions to societal problems by legislation 
instead of using other tools. The formal rules for creating and adopting legislative acts, 
including those contained in the constitution, are also very flexible. Laws are generally 
conceived not as instrument of policies (or implementation of Cabinet programme) but as tools 
to implement single political issue. 
Parliament is burdened with legislative tasks, allowing insufficient time for thorough 
deliberation. Delegated legislation does not have the same importance as statutory one. Formal 
and institutional guarantees of rule of law (including the activity of the Constitutional Court) 
are preserved, but quality of legislation lags behind. During legislative drafting, formalities are 
observed yet impact assessments and consultations are often performed perfunctorily or not at 
all. Justifications for legislative proposals are regularly prepared (as procedural rules foresee), 
but the real aim of legislation mostly remains unclear. Constitutional compliance and legislative 
rules are controlled during the whole drafting process at multiple stages (quality-checking by 
the MoJ at inter-ministerial consultations, Committee for Legislation in the parliamentary 
phase), unfortunately strategic questions like ‘which kind of legislation is needed’ (if any) are 
                                                   
40 Law no. CXCV/2011 on State finances. 
41 Gajduschek 2016, ibid, p. 811. 
hardly raised. Concepts (green papers etc.) are not prepared or consulted, instead, long 
paragraphed legislative proposals are drafted in the first step of the procedure.  
All this lead to the change of legislative roles. In ideal circumstances, politicians define the 
main targets or concepts of legislation, and the expertise of the ministries define the tools to 
reach them. The Hungarian practice shows the contrary: very often civil servants define political 
targets by choosing legislative tools and drafting legal texts, and politicians consequently debate 
over detailed provisions of legislative proposals.42 Government’s legislation is characterised by 
political agenda-setting implemented by legal procedures and expertise, wider policy aspects 
(societal, sustainability) are often neglected. Despite these deficiencies, the legislative system 
is still able to handle and coordinate professional and complex procedures, which – in times of 
constant ongoing policy reforms and increasing quantity of EU-legislation to be transposed – 
is clearly an advantage. 
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jogrendszer állapota (MTA TK 2016). 
